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MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN*

A Perspective on Federal Corporation Law

"The Fall and Rise of Federal
Corporation Law," I was reminded of the curriculum at the University of Colorado
Law School when I arrived there as a teacher in 1979. Our curriculum included a
course called "Federal Corporation Law." I recall being mystified as to what that
was. I graduated from law school only five years before and never heard of the
concept of federal corporate law, much less envisioned a course on it. As it turned
out, 1979 was the last year that course was taught at Colorado. Indeed, by that time
the United States Supreme Court had already decided Santa Fe Industries v. Green,'
which seriously undercut the concept of federal corporation law,2 at least the way it
was taught in that particular course.
If one looks back from 1979, say to 1964, one might describe the history of
federal corporation law as characterized by a rise and then a fall followed by a
second rise. In other words, we might have added a third phase to the title of this
symposium because federal corporation law was validated by the Supreme Court in
its 1964 decision of J. L Case v. Borak.3 In Borak, the Court recognized a private
cause of action under the Securities and Exchange Act of 19344 for false and misleading proxy statements, even though the '34 Act itself did not provide such a
private cause of action and state law did.5 Several years later, the Court decided
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life, 6 which established a broad "in connecIN THINKING ABOUT THE TITLE OF THIS SYMPOSIUM,

tion with" test for private damage actions under Rule 10b-5.' With the decisions in
J. L Case, which validated the federal courts' recognition of implied causes of action
under the federal securities laws,' and Superintendent of Insurance, which made it

easier for plaintiffs to state a cause of action under Rule 10b-5,9 the era of federal
corporation law was approaching its zenith. The meaning of the concept was that
Nicholas A. Rosenbaum Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School.
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the federal courts could use the federal securities laws to address deficiencies in
corporate governance, a matter traditionally thought to rest within the province of
state law. This encroachment was undertaken without so much as a mention of the
fact that recognizing a federal cause of action might displace state law.
This period, dating back to approximately 1947, and marked by two important
Supreme Court decisions, constitutes the first rise of federal corporation law. The
fall began in 1975 with Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,0 where the Court
announced that private litigation under Rule 10b-5 had to be trimmed back."
While foreshadowing future prunings, the Court limited standing by holding that a
private party 2 had to be either a purchaser or a seller of securities to maintain a
damage action under Rule 10b-5.13 It was not enough that a fraudulent prospectus
dissuaded one from purchasing a security, even if the issuer of those securities
fraudulently intended to dissuade purchases, as was alleged in Blue Chip Stamps.
Nor was it enough, as future cases decided, if one was fraudulently induced not to
sell a security that one held. 4 Two years later, the Court decided Santa Fe Industries
v. Green,' holding that Rule 10b-5 would not support a cause of action for breach
of fiduciary duty. 6 Federal corporation law was now in a serious tailspin. More
importantly, in Santa Fe the Court acknowledged the traditional role of state law
and the potential encroachment created by an expansive application of the federal
securities laws.' 7
The low point, or high point, depending on your perspective, during this second
phase came in 1995 in CentralBank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A.," where the
Court denied a cause of action for aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5.' 9
This case was decided against a background of numerous lower court decisions that
recognized an aiding and abetting claim.2" One interesting side note about Central
Bank is that no federalism concerns were mentioned in the decision. The Court did
not talk about the probability or the possibility that the existence of a state law
cause of action could justify not recognizing a federal cause of action. Central Bank
marked the fall of federal corporation law.

10. 421 U.s. 723 (1975).
11. Id. at 730-31.
12. This holding was limited to private parties, as opposed to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
13. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730.
14. Id. at 731.
15. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
16. Id. at 476.
17. Id. at 479.
18. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
19. Id. at 191.
20. See, e.g., SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1046 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 834 (1977); Walck v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 1051, 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affd, 687 F.2d 778
(3d Cir. 1982); Bloor v. Dankser (In re Investors Funding Corp.), 523 F. Supp. 533, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd,
752 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Geo. H.
McFadden & Bro., Inc. v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 295 F. Supp. 587, 589 (N.D. Okla. 1968).
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The second rise began with United States v. O'Hagan2" in 1997. This was another
Rule 10b-5 case." This time, a lawyer for a bidder bought stock in the target company.23 When the announcement of the tender offer was made, the lawyer cashed
out at a handsome profit.24 The issue was the same issue as in Superintendent of
Insurance v. Bankers Life:2 whether the attorney's action was a fraud in connection
with a securities transaction. The O'Hagan Court held that the lawyer deceived his
client, and that this deception occurred in connection with his purchase of securities.2 It is debatable whether the Court was on firm ground in either respect.2" As
to the deception, the lawyer did not say to the client "Thanks for this information. I
will not trade on it." That would be a deception. Indeed, he said nothing to the
client. Nonetheless, and with little discussion, the Court concluded that it is a deception for a lawyer to take such information and use it for his own purposes. 9
More controversial was the Court's conclusion that the deception occurred in connection with the purchase of securities.3" The Court was satisfied that there was a
sufficient link between this deception and the subsequent transaction, even if the
sellers of the stock were not deceived." Thus, with some creative reasoning, a fact
situation that is a classic breach of fiduciary duty, the subject of state law for centuries, was transformed into a criminal charge under the federal securities laws.
The second rise of federal corporation law, which began with O'Hagan,32 has
resulted in the preemption of state law, either expressly or implicitly. This expansion of Rule 10b-5 and federal power in general has taken place simultaneously
with a wide-spread perception that the Court is honoring principles of federalism. 3
This perception is grounded on a few high-profile cases, the first of which is United
States v. Lopez.34
Decided in 1995, Lopez is a case that corporate lawyers never talk about because
it involves the Gun-Free School Zones Act.35 The Supreme Court held that federal
law cannot regulate the possession of guns in a school area because it is beyond

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
L. 395,

521 U.S. 642 (1997).
Id. at 646.
Id. at 647-48.
Id. at 648.
404 U.S. 6 (1971).
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
Id.
See id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 658-59.
Elliott J. Weiss, United States v. O'Hagan: Pragmatism Returns to the Law of Insider Trading, 23 J. CORP.
429 (1998).
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O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656-57.
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Id. at 642.
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See Mark J. Loewenstein, The Supreme Court, Rule lob-5 and the Federalization of CorporateLaw, 39
IND. L. REV. 17, 30-31 (2005).

34.

514 U.S. 549 (1995).

35. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 922(g), 104 Stat. 4884, invalidated by
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. 6 Seven years later, in United States
v. Morrison,37 the Court stuck another blow in favor of federalism when it held that
the federal Violence Against Women Act3" was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.39 Commentators look at these two decisions, and several others during that period, and conclude that the Court is indeed committed to a more
vigorous concept of federalism.4" However, if you look at O'Haganand other business law cases that have not received the notoriety of Lopez and Morrison, you
might reach just the opposite conclusion. Are O'Hagan, and other post-O'Hagan
securities law cases the anomalies, or are Morrison and Lopez the anomalies? I think
that the Lopez and Morrison cases are anomalies. Indeed, the steady march of
greater federal power recognized in the Supreme Court continues pretty much unabated. Perhaps these cases have flown under the radar screen and been overshadowed by the strong reaction to Morrison and Lopez, both positive and negative.
Perhaps, the legal community has taken its eye off what I think is an important
trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
As I mentioned previously, O'Hagan is a case where the Court recognized as a
federal criminal violation conduct that could be characterized as a simple breach of
fiduciary duty.4" A lawyer, as a fiduciary for his client, steals his client's information
and trades on it.42 Such facts also support a state criminal prosecution.43 Indeed,
O'Hagan was prosecuted under state law,44 and the need for federal intervention
was minimal in that case.
One additional note about the O'Hagan opinion is in order. The majority opinion says that its decision was necessary in order to further the purposes of the
federal securities laws-maintaining the integrity of securities markets and so
forth.4" The Court said this without any real empirical justification that this type of
insider trading has any affect on the market.46 Moreover, as Justice Thomas pointed
out, the Court's job is not to implement the purposes of statutes, but rather its
words and the intent. 47 I think that Justice Thomas was on to something when he
stated that "Rule lob-5 cannot be said to embody this theory ....
36. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
37. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
38. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 13981, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000).
39. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607-27.
40. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Constitutionalizingthe Federal Criminal Law Debate: Morrison, Jones and
the ABA, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 983, 986-87; Bradley A. Harsch, Finding a Sound Commerce Clause Doctrine:
Time to Evaluate the Structural Necessity of Federal Legislation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 983, 984-85 (2001).
41. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
42. Id. at 658-59.
43. Id. at 648 n.2.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 653.
46. See id. at 687 (Thomas, I., dissenting).
47. Id. at 691-92.
48. Id.
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One little noticed post-O'Hagan case worth considering in this context is Wharf
(Holdings) Ltd. vs. United Int'l Holdings, Inc.4" because it is typical of the way the
Supreme Court has acted in this area."° It involved a situation where two companies
formed a joint venture to build a cable television system in Hong Kong."' The
parties orally agreed that if the venture was successful, the defendant would provide
the plaintiff with an opportunity to buy stock in the company.52 Of course, the
defendant refused to honor the oral understanding. 3 Instead of bringing a breach
of contract claim, however, the plaintiff brought a federal securities fraud claim,
alleging that the defendant never intended to honor this option. 4 The plaintiff
argued that this was deceptive conduct in connection with the sale of an option.55
The question before the Supreme Court was whether this alleged deception was in
connection with the purchase and the sale of a security.56 Lo and behold, the Court
found a basis for federal jurisdiction57 and concluded that this deceptive conduct
was in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.5" One might have thought
that it was a garden-variety breach of contract claim, but no, this falls under Rule
10b-5.
Wharf (Holdings) is remarkable, in part, because it does not cite or discuss
Marine Bank v. Weaver,59 which was decided during the period when the concept of
federal corporation law was in decline. In Weaver, the Court said that neither a
profit-sharing arrangement between two parties nor a certificate of deposit was a
security under the federal securities laws.' ° Instead, to decide whether these things
constitute securities, the Court required an examination of the context in which
these instruments were issued.6' Ultimately, the Court found that there was no
need to apply the federal securities laws under these circumstances.62 This was a
sensible way to approach the problem, but one that the Court chose not to consider
in deciding Wharf (Holdings).
So, one might ask, what is the harm in applying Rule 10b-5 to the Wharf (Holdings) fact pattern? This is, however, a private arrangement between two parties,
where a federal interest seems nonexistent. State law, relying on other principles,

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

532 U.S. 588 (2001).
See Loewenstein, supra note 33, at 32-34.
Wharf (Holdings), 532 U.S. at 591.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 593-97.
Id.
455 U.S. 551 (1982).
Id. at 559-60.
Id. at 556.
Id at 560-61
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may have resolved the dispute differently.63 For instance, state law may have considered the statute of frauds as relevant to the outcome. That is, perhaps a plaintiffs
right to acquire stock would not be enforceable at all under state law or perhaps the
recoverable damages differ significantly from those available under Rule 10b-5.'
These policy questions, resolved under state law, are now federalized under Rule
10b-5. 5
The third case in this new paradigm, following O'Hagan and Wharf (Holdings),
is SEC v. Zandford," where a unanimous Supreme Court, in a relatively brief opinion, easily expanded the reach of Rule 10b-5. 6' This case has a fact pattern that
looks eerily like a law school exam question. An elderly man and his mentally
disabled daughter opened up a brokerage account. 6 ' The broker stole money from
the account and, as a result, suffered numerous consequences, including dismissal
from his job, revocation of his license, and criminal penalties. 69 After all of these
consequences, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) decided to bring an
enforcement action against the broker for violating Rule 10b-5. °
The Court of Appeals held that there was no jurisdiction under Rule 10b-5 because this was just a common theft from an account.7 Thus, there was no fraud in
connection with the sale of the security. On appeal, the Supreme Court had little
trouble concluding otherwise. The Court found that the broker deceived his clients
by failing to tell them that he was going to steal the proceeds when securities were
sold in their account.72 The Court went so far as to say that he did not even have to
misappropriate the funds." It was enough that he had a scheme, the sale took place,
and the funds were in the account. This was a fairly broad interpretation of the
federal securities laws.
It is hard to identify the federal interest involved, or the underlying policy that
informed the Court's decision. After all, the federal wire fraud statute applied, the
state criminal law applied, NASD discipline applied, the state security administra-

63. See Loewenstein, supra note 33, at 34.
64. Francis J. Facciolo & Richard Stone, Avoiding the Inevitable: The Continuing Viability of State Law
Claims in the Face of Primary Jurisdictionand Preemption Challenges Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
1995 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 535, 623-24.
65. See generally Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings Inc., 532 U.S. 588 (2001) (holding that
defendant's conduct in refusing to honor a stock option agreement was deceptive conduct in connection with
the sale of a security under Rule 10b-5); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (holding that an
attorney's action in deceiving his client was in connection with a securities transaction, in violation of Rule
10b-5).
66. 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
67. See generally id. (holding that a broker's sale of securities with undisclosed intent to misappropriate the
proceeds was fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities).
68. Id. at 815.
69. Id. at 816.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 818.
72. Id. at 822.
73. Id.

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS

& TECHNOLOGY LAW

MARK

J.

LOEWENSTEIN

tor could certainly have disciplined the broker, a private damage action obviously
was available under state law, and finally, the guy was fired. Did Congress intend to
empower a federal agency to address this conduct as well? What we see here is the
SEC motivated to expand its jurisdiction and, with that, a robust role for
Rule 10b-5.
A sterling example of other cases that expand the reach of federal law can be
found in cases decided by the Court under the Federal Arbitration Act."4 These
cases have expanded the reach of the Act far beyond anything that Congress intended when it passed the statute in 1925. Another rich area for examination are
the preemption cases, where the Court has been very willing to find federal pre75
emption when there are other solutions the Court could have found. Finally, consider the punitive damages cases, where the Court has disrespected state law by
developing a jurisprudence that would define when punitive damages violate the
federal constitution.76
One can argue whether an expansive role for federal law in corporate governance
or antifraud is a good thing or not. But the critical question is whether this expansion should be the result of judicial fiat, as opposed to legislative action. Judicial
displacement of state law is not a good thing, at least not in the perfunctory fashion
in which it has taken place.77 It is time for a bit more dialogue and examination,
because this has led to a second "rise in federal corporation law."

74. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947). See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52 (2003) (holding that
debt-restructuring agreements executed in Alabama by Alabama residents are nonetheless governed by the
provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Waffle House, Inc., 534
U.S. 279 (2001) (holding that an arbitration agreement does not bar the EEOC from pursuing victim specific
judicial relief on behalf of an employee); Cortex Bird Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193
(2000) (holding that the venue provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act are permissive, permitting a motion to
confirm, vacate or modify an arbitration award either where the award was made or in any distruct proper
under the general venue statute).
75. See, e.g., Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003) (holding that the cause of action at issue
arose under federal law and could therefore be removed to federal court); Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39 (2003) (holding that prior cases rest on a foundation broad enough to require preemption of the Public Service Commission's order); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341
(2001) (holding that the plaintiff's state law fraud claims conflicted with and were therefore impliedly preempted by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).
76. See, e.g., BMW of North Am., Inc., v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding that the two million dollar
punitive damages award was grossly excessive and therefore in excess of the federal constitutional limit); Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (holding that the state high court's denial of review of the size of the
punitive damages award violates the Due Process Clause); cf TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S.
443 (1993) (holding that the amount of punitive damages was not so grossly excessive as to violate due
process).
77. See Loewenstein, supra note 33, at 48-49.
VOL. 2 NO. 2 2007

